Central Intelligence Agency

Preparing for Martial Law Central Intelligence Agency

Between July 1980 and December 13, 1981, Poland stumbled through the most serious political crisis faced by a Warsaw Pact member since the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The resolution of this crisis through the declaration of martial law by the Polish authorities provided only a temporary respite. The rise and suppression of the trade union Solidarity, followed by the inability of Polish communist authorities to restore political credibility or economic activity, were key developments that created the conditions that led to the eventual collapse of the Warsaw Pact by the end of the decade. On one side was a Polish society deeply disenchanted with its political system and the mismanagement of its economy that resulted in increased deprivation in the late 1970's. Initial strikes in July and August 1980 protesting relatively mild increases in meat prices escalated as workers vowed not to accept near-term promises by the authorities. For the first time in post-war Poland, workers were joined by intellectuals bent on changing the broader political system. The meteoric and chaotic rise of Solidarity resulted in a mass movement with increasing determination to pursue fundamental change. Facing this unprecedented development was a communist party apparatus with limited support, even from its members, and one that was lulled into lethargy by the vain hope of restoring calm with the time-tested tactic of buying off the opposition. Senior political and military authorities were averse to using force in the early months because of the memories of the deaths of shipyard workers during the uprisings in the Gdansk shipyards in December 1970. As events spiraled out of control during the 18 months of the crisis, powers that be engaged in lengthy discussions of whether, when, and how Polish authorities could impose order through martial law. This discussion was strongly influenced by the hard line taken by Soviet political and military leaders who continually and arrogantly pushed Polish authorities to immediately resort to force. Soviet officials not so subtly tried to intimidate Polish authorities by implying that they would use both their own forces in addition to other Warsaw Pact forces to restore order (if necessary). Partly out of consideration for self-preservation and partly as a result of intense Soviet pressure, Polish authorities slowly and sometimes grudgingly proceeded with operational planning to introduce martial law. These plans, including all the required legal documentation, were essentially completed by the fall of 1981. In 1972, Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff, volunteered his services to the United States at a time of increased friction between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. Over the coming years, Kuklinski provided the CIA with thousands of pieces of key information regarding the Warsaw Pact. During the Polish crisis he continued to provide such information and also provided information and commentary regarding internal Polish developments and Soviet pressures.